Amara, Interrupted (An Eden Daire Short)

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Maybe someone has a wrong number??? Who knows, but I'm getting annoyed. Any idea who this is, when you call back you get a disconnect.

ID-number of the ring doesnt seem valid. Another is rang just like that? I keep getting calls from this number and others saying the same thing from all over the use all different numbers but saying the same thing. Fake survey takers apparently as they don't know when to stop calling and they use different numbers with the same caller ID every few days. Also the person calling is Rubin Golstein at x I have tried contacting him back and left messages letting him know I will be reporting this harrassment.

Just today he has contacted my place of business after he was told by my supervisor it is illegal to contact me here. It is Wells Fargo Bank. They call if you have had a negative balance in your bank for 2 weeks or longer. They are calling to get you to deposit money ASAP into your account. No experience required. This no. As there was no chance in the msg to let 'em recognise that that individual doesnt live here, we rang the no. Obviously, a solicitor, I HATE these calls because they always come during a busy time, nap time, but the most annoying is the fact they never leave a message.

If anyone finds out who these people are, please post so I can report them. They call and noone answers They call almost everyday at least once or twice even on Sunday. Not that I doubt you even the slightest bit but, how do you know its homeland security? In other texts prominent theologians declared loyalty to the throne to be as important as following the gospels. It is, however, also possible to discern a number of recurrent themes that transcend the actor-based approach that underlies it.

Diferent authors in this volume seem to give diferent answers to this question, but I think they may not necessarily be contradictory. Famously, he declared himself to be the friend of the million Muslims of the world during his visit to the mausoleum of Saladin in Damascus. In Istanbul, meanwhile, the vice-commander in chief and war minister Enver Pasha seems to have had doubts about the advisability of a Jihad declaration in a situation in which the empire was so visibly linked to European Christian allies, preferring a call by the Sultan to Muslims in the colonies of the Entente instead, but his chief of the general staf, the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf was strongly in favour.

All of this seems to support the thesis that the declaration of Jihad was primarily the result of German policies. Jihad was part of the Ottoman political vernacular. He argues that, while on the one hand the Ottomans went along with the unrealistic expectations of the Germans and declared a Jihad that aimed at triggering uprisings in India, North Africa and Central Asia, on the other hand they also promoted Jihad to achieve purely Ottoman policy objectives, notably the galvanizing of the Arab and Kurdish populations of the empire.

In the case of the Arabs of southern Iraq, who had been going over to the Shia in large numbers in the preceding decades, the carefully tailored Ottoman Jihad campaign speciically aimed at this community seems to have been quite successful. Ottomans and Germans both used it, but with diferent aims and expectations. Logistically the movement of How Was the Message of Jihad Mediated?

Of course, proclaiming a Jihad in itself was not enough. In very diferent ways a number of the contributions to this volume draw our attention to ways in which the message of Jihad was mediated. Public meetings were an important means of communication.

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Nicole van Os produces evidence that in women as well as men were involved in these public meetings, something that would have been unthinkable ten years earlier. As we know also from other occasions the constitutional revolution of , the boycotts of , and , the mobilizations of and posters were an efective means of communication even though the vast majority of the Ottoman population was illiterate.

As everywhere else, in the Ottoman Empire too, World War i was an era of censorship and propaganda. Journalism and literature were harnessed to the war efort, even if they were of necessity less efective tools than in societies with a high rate of literacy and large-circulation newspapers and journals. Gussone shows that, in line with the worldwide Jihadist ambitions of the German Empire, this mosque deliberately incorporated stylistic elements from a range of Islamic civilizations. Networks of agents were created in North Africa, Central Asia and South Asia, but they were not strong enough seriously to threaten the position of the Entente.

Mediation was not by words, written or spoken, alone. Was the Proclamation of Jihad a Failure? It has become almost a commonplace in the historiography of the Middle East in World War i to say that the German-inspired call to Jihad was a complete failure, and it is an indisputable fact that neither mass desertions of Muslim soldiers in the British, French and Russian armies nor large-scale uprisings in their imperial possessions took place. But the contributions to this volume show that this negative assessment has to be nuanced. It is certainly true that enormous numbers of soldiers deserted from the Ottoman army, speciically in —, when conditions in the army became almost unbearable.

By the army was undermanned and undersupplied, and faced with vastly superior British manpower and equipment it could manage an orderly retreat at best. How did they react? Among the Sunni Arabs of the Mashreq and the Arabian peninsula the propaganda had less tangible results. It is true that in the more densely populated and centrally controlled areas of Syria and Palestine the leading Arab families generally stayed loyal to the Ottoman throne until the end, even if some of their members favoured the idea of decentralization.

But in the borderlands of the empire, in the areas where the Ottomans had less direct control and had to rely on persuasion and negotiation, the results were less good. It was the rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca that caused the Ottomans the most headaches, and not just because of its military potential which was rather limited. As Joshua Teitelbaum shows, the Sharif with British help established a propaganda campaign built on religious argument and he stopped only just short of claiming the caliphate for himself as he would do in It was the defence of Medina.

As far as the efect of the Jihad proclamation on Arabs outside the empire is concerned, the position of one of the leading Arab intellectuals of his age, Ahmed Rida, as analysed by Umar Ryad in this volume, is illustrative. In he lived in Egypt, and winning over someone like Rida would have been essential if the call for Jihad was to be efective among Arabs abroad.

But he was not won over. Essentially Rida saw the war as a power struggle between European states whose conlict was imported into the Middle East. He was not swayed by the Jihad propaganda and assessed the events primarily, even almost exclusively, in terms of the chances they might ofer for the establishment of an independent Arab state. For this purpose, he came to see the British as the best hope.

In it was not at all clear that it could not work. Oppenheim, who authored the key programmatic text of the German Jihad efort, was not someone who had dreamt up these ideas in a study in Berlin. He was mistaken in thinking the resentment could be translated into active support for the Ottoman caliph, but the potential for rebellion was certainly there, as the immediate post-war period would show. It was when the Ottomans and Germans actively tried to play the Jihad card that it proved of little practical value, at least in its southern borderlands and beyond the borders.

His Islamic State has conquered a number of provincial towns in Syria and Iraq and one major city Mosul. It has been able to attract thousands of volunteers from all over the world, volunteers who have quite oten exercised extreme and demonstrative violence, but, shocking as this may be, this is not what ultimately fuels the fear of Jihad in the western world.

It is the uncertainty about the degree of support for the Jihad among the large Muslim communities in European and American countries, the feeling of living on a volcano a metaphor used by al-Baghdadi himself , that creates fear and that makes the call for Jihad efective. Karpat ed.

Kerslake, K. Robins ed. He had become famous through his monograph on Mecca, based on ieldwork in the Holy City, through his seminal studies on Islamic law and his work as an adviser for Islamic afairs in the Dutch East Indies. He held one of the oldest chairs in Arabic studies in Europe and assumed his authority on policy matters of Islam and colonialism with gravitas.

He condemned it as an act of utter barbarism, comparing the feuding Bedouin favourably to the warring parties, in that they at least were more careful in shedding blood. He published a reply in De Gids and several other articles to defend himself and Germany. You might well have concluded that the insinuation against me that I would have sacriiced my scholarly conscience, exclusively rests on an insuicient knowledge of German and on a misunderstanding caused by this. I am very sad. As a human being he has lost much in my eyes.

In this chapter I will explore this harsh polemic between colleagues and friends. Snouck Hurgronje proclaims himself a defender of the pre-war academic internationalism, promoting civilization at large, while Becker stresses the need to be a good patriot irst. In the end Snouck Hurgronje also claims his right as a good patriot to defend Dutch colonial interests in the Indies.

As such the debate and their strong feelings reveal their convictions about the social use of scholarship and the diferent ethical values that they take into account, as well as the various interests to which they give primacy. I will not try to establish whether he was right or wrong in his assessments and analyses, since I am not a specialist on the history of the Ottoman Empire or on the Great War.

My concern is the history of Orientalist scholarship and its relations with colonial and nationalist policy-making; thus I focus on the role of scholars in the instrumentalization of Islam. It is striking to see how much has been written about the German involvement in the Ottoman Jihad declaration and about this very polemic. Taking a detour should bring Europeans to reason, while the vignette at the same time proves that Snouck Hurgronje is right in his analysis that Muslims are capable of progress and that the violence of the erupting war is imposed on them from outside rather than being of their own making.

Snouck Hurgronje continues by expressing his own horror of the war in strong terms. He irst discusses a brochure written by Hugo Grothe, who is a specialist in economics and a scientiic traveller, but clearly lacks the philological credentials properly to understand what is going on in the Ottoman Empire, as his limited knowledge of the Turkish languages shows. For him this is only a theatre piece that the cynical elite organized to harness the credulous common people to their own goals. For in normal times we know that the Germans are far too sensible and logical to digest the enormous nonsense that a thing which in general would be considered as a shame for mankind and a catastrophe for Turkey can become good and commendable as soon as Germany places herself behind or beside the Crescent.

Still, we keep hoping in the interest of humanity that Germany will before long withdraw the new product from the market. Snouck Hurgronje sees it as the task of the colonizers to teach their Muslim subjects to expand their view of community to all mankind and to teach them how to live in peace with all mankind. Hartmann initially reacted favourably to Snouck Hurgronje in a letter, but soon took sides with Becker.

Becker was outspoken in letters to Hartmann: Snouck Hurgronje misunderstood him because of an inadequate knowledge of German. Despite his claims he is far from neutral. Becker decided to reply to Snouck Hurgronje with an extensive article in a German periodical in February Snouck Hurgronje obtained the right to reply with an article in the issue of 1 May , to which a Schlusswort by Becker is added. In his public reply Becker took up the issues that had already come up in the private correspondence with his colleagues. Despite the intense feeling of hurt and disappointment Becker intends to reply in a scholarly way to all the allegations.

Germany does not want to colonize Turkey either, but is a true friend. Turkey has a future as an Islamic state, but in European style. Holland prides itself on being in a position to repair the bonds of scholarly internationalism through its neutrality. Unfortunately, the derailing of Snouck Hurgronje has made the performance of this ideal and very real paciism immensely more diicult.

But he maintains his contention that Becker has changed his scholarly views for political reasons, and continues to object to the primacy that Becker gives to patriotism in his analysis of Ottoman institutions and policies. Snouck Hurgronje contrasts this view with his own constancy of opinion and his lifelong involvement in furthering peaceful relations, grounded in 30 years of personal relations with Muslims He feels insulted by the suggestion that he is uncritically following the propaganda of the Allies , and stresses his deep academic knowledge He concludes that as a patriot he should also defend Dutch colonial interests in the East Indies.

He considers the use of the Jihad weapon to be a crime: it is an invitation to murder for ill-willing fanatics and may cause considerable harm. He ends his rejoinder in his well-known rhetorical style, by pro- claiming the jihad akbar. Not according to the Ottoman understanding, but to its authentic meaning, in the way that the prophet Muhammad understood it, being a return to the virtues of self-control. Becker has the last word in the same issue.

Since they will not convince each other, there is no need to continue. Snouck Hurgronje in his rejoinder refers to his defence of Dutch interests in the East Indies, but Becker turns this into the main motive that has structured his condemnation of the war efort from the beginning. However, Snouck Hurgronje has been under constant attack for this from Christian politicians.

Claims to Jihad and pan-Islamism are a direct menace to this ethical policy and to his own reputation. However, for Germany and its ally Turkey the use of Jihad is entirely justiied, which explains their controversy. Becker ends by seeking a consensus. He expresses the hope that the revolt by Muslims against their colonial oppressors will in the long run result in a more humane policy towards them being instigated by England and France. In this way the war may contribute to the achievement of a colonial Islam policy that Snouck Hurgronje has been advocating all his life.

Becker concludes that their disagreement is about method only.

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He and Snouck Hurgronje ultimately strive towards the same goals: to further the well-being of their countries and of the Asian peoples. Becker again stressed the political nature of their disagreement, and the legitimacy of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in using Jihad and pan-Islamism as weapons in the war. Germany and Turkey share many interests and therefore ight together, not for sentimental reasons. He underlined its consistency for centuries, to which religious political parties started to protest, however, during the nineteenth century, pretending that the government took too lenient an attitude towards Islam.

He stresses his neutrality, but he also repeats his anger and concern about the dangerous use of Islam in the war efort in strong personal words. During that same year Snouck Hurgronje would publish two more articles on the holy war in a Dutch newspaper, explaining his views to a general audience. In the years to come he would follow with great interest the revolt in Arabia and the demise of the caliphate, expressing his analyses in a series of articles in popular and scholarly publications.

In he drew attention to a semi-oicial explanation by the Committee of National Defence of the Jihad declaration aimed at Muslims, and an oicial correction issued by the Ottoman government limiting Jihad to states with which Turkey was at war. He also contributed a series of necrologies of former students who fell victim to the war efort.

Becker had cherished high expectations of this lamneted martyr for the Nation. In Becker was appointed to the Ministry of Culture and designed a new policy to further the academic study of foreign cultures and countries. Ater the war he would obtain even more important political positions, culminating in two appointments as a Minister of Culture. All this would keep him from seriously continuing his scholarly work until his early death in Snouck Hurgronje included the English translation, with minor revisions, in in volume iii of his collected studies, published in Germany, together with his other essays about the war and its atermath.

Underlying his understanding of Germany prompting the Ottoman government to proclaim Jihad is a general view of the evolution of human societies. He constantly contrasts a medieval Muslim society, in which religion and politics are fused and in which unbelievers are excluded from the community on the basis of their non-adherence to Islam, with a modern civilization characterized by a separation between religion and politics and an inclusive view of humanity. Snouck Hurgronje understands colonialism not only as an economic phenomenon serving the interests of the colonizers, but also as a civilizing project which will beneit the colonized by introducing them to modernity.

His thinking is elitist, in that he stresses the gap between the educated elite and the credulous common people, who are liable to fanaticism. Education is the main tool to bring modernity to the elite, who will understand the virtues of separating religion and politics.

A modern educated elite will replace them, and this will be a faithful collaborator in the colonial project. Snouck Hurgronje shares this contempt for political Islam with many of his fellow scholars, notably Martin Hartmann. His view of the place of Islamic law in a modern colonial society is linked to this judgement.

Islamic law should be limited to the sphere of private life. However, Islamic law does not have a place in the ordering of public life. Scholars can contribute to progress by endorsing the colonial project which brings education, progress and peace to people still living in the Middle Ages, such as Muslims fusing politics and religion. Snouck Hurgonje rejects and despises the racism of many of the advocates of colonialism: all people are capable of progress thanks to education.

Scholars should advocate such a humanistic approach to colonialism.

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Snouck Hurgronje was, together with Becker and Hartmann, one of the founders of the study of contemporary Muslim societies. Unlike many of their colleagues they did not consider the study of contemporary Islam beneath them. For Snouck Hurgronje proper scholarship was epitomized by sound- ness of knowledge and sharp analysis, combined with a moral sense of engagement in society. His harsh judgement of Becker demonstrates his belief in objective criteria for scholarship. Becker was both wrong in his analysis, as implied by his sudden, entirely politically motivated change of views on Turkey, and in his moral position-taking.

His colleague and friend had sacriiced scholarly truth to nationalist politics, thereby endangering world peace, progress and the interests of both colonizing and colonized people. Although Snouck Hurgronje also sharply criticized other authors, especially Grothe, Becker had to bear the brunt of his attack. Grothe was a mere economist and traveller, whom he could not take too seriously given his lack of a good command of the Turkish language, criticized in a footnote.

His faith faltered and he showed more interest in a historical critical approach to the origins of Islam, resulting in a doctoral thesis on the origins of the pilgrimage ritual in Mecca. His lust for knowledge and adventure was such that he managed to convince the Dutch government to send him on a mission to Arabia in — to gather information about the Indonesian pilgrims in Mekka. Snouck Hurgronje was not satisied with remaining in Jedda at the Dutch consulate.

De Lostalot circulated rumours about the presence of an unbeliever in Mekka, which made the Ottoman governor order Snouck Hurgronje to leave the holy city without delay. Snouck Hurgronje was very close to his German colleagues from the beginning of his scholarly career. Snouck Hurgronje published mainly in Dutch and in German, for example his two volume monograph on Mekka appeared in German, and only the second volume on ethnography was translated much later into English. In this network German colleagues occupied a privileged place.

His monograph on Mekka and the two accompanying volumes of photographs brought him scholarly fame. He was not content with his teaching positions at the University of Leiden and the Delt Institute for Colonial Administrators and in eagerly accepted a position in the Dutch East Indies as an adviser for Islamic afairs, where he would stay until Snouck Hurgronje did extensive research on lived Islam and collected many materials. His intelligence work led again to the publication of several important scholarly monographs and numerous articles.

Towards the end of his stay he felt that his pleas for the promotion of the interests of the native population were not always respected. As a professor in Leiden he was strongly interested in educating members of the Indonesian elite in accordance with his ideals about their vital role in the development of their country. In his insistence on the possibility of educating a secular elite to bring the Muslim world to modernity we may hear echoes of this recent success.

Likewise his insistence on separating religion and politics might refer to his personal convictions, which seem to be related to an agnostic position. Snouck Hurgronje was an outstanding scholar, who played a decisive role in the creation of the study of Islam in Western academia. In his scholarship he was cosmopolitan. He was an excellent ieldworker, gited in gathering information in the ield with the help of faithful informants and assistants, with whom he maintained correspondences over decades.

He also developed an extensive network of colleagues and friends in Western academia, and was one of the leading igures in the congresses of Orientalist scholars and in the creation of the oriental- ist overview of Islam par excellence, the Encyclopaedia of Islam. It was also knowledge that should be applied, in the interests of both the colonizers and the col- onized. Snouck Hurgronje served his country, but he also wanted to eman- cipate the Muslims and improve their lives. So far I have found hardly any questioning of this involvement as such.

On the contrary, both Snouck Hurgronje and Becker, like many of their contemporaries, considered the use of scholarship and the action of scholars in the administration of Muslims to be one of the aims of their work. Snouck Hurgronje and Carl Heinrich Becker were, together with colleagues like Martin Hartmann and Alfred Le Chatelier, among the founding fathers of the study of contemporary Islam which understood itself as an applied science and actively sought to address the problems of policy-making in colonialism and international relations. Snouck Hurgronje seems to have been among the rare exceptions to prefer peace to action and to defend internationalism.

Becker clearly disapproves of his utopian paciism, and attacks it as unworldly, and later on presents it as serving his national and personal interests in colonial policy in disguise.

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Ottoman army in Baghdad. Fortunately he survived the war. Perhaps he gathered something more than the texts of war poetry that he published aterwards in his Mesopotamische Studien — Well before World War ii he went to Istanbul and remained there until and returned there again from until It hardly stirred any uprisings against the colonial masters, nor did it help much to rally Muslims to the Ottoman cause.

German scholars were not only involved in providing them with reading materials, but also used the soldiers from the French, British and Russian colonial empires as informants for their linguistic, ethnomusicological and ethnographic studies. It is unclear to what extent this served the war efort, but it led to detailed ethnographic monographs aterwards, such as Sitte und Recht in Nordafrika by Ernst Ubach and Ernst Rackow and others , published in Even if the proclamation did not work out as planned, the colonizing nations thought it wise to request the explicit loyalty of their Muslim subjects.

In London he Times published a series of declarations from Muslims in India on 12 November , while the Aga Khan had already expressed his support on 4 November. For Becker the praise that Snouck Hurgronje obtained from the French in for example Le Temps of 20 January demonstrated once again that his scholarly analysis was in fact a support for the allied cause, which made his claim to neutrality questionable. Recently Dietrich Jung published an overview article with extensive references ofering a lesson for the area studies debate and for the understanding of the Arab spring.

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Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch collected a series of case studies on the German involvement in the Jihad Christiaan Engberts is preparing a study on the ideals about the scholarly persona that he is reconstructing from the correspondence that resulted from the clash between the two scholars. For me two of the most enlightening studies on the debate were the articles by Schwanitz and Hagen Its sound historical research would clarify many of the issues raised by the two protagonists.

It would also nicely contrast the concerns and ethics of scholars who thought they were serving their countries, the Muslims and humanity at large by their applied Islam studies, with those scholars of the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-irst who have been ushered into post-colonial thinking by Edward Said. However, all this falls outside the scope of this article, but remains a desideratum for another occasion. Conclusion: Orientalism as Cultural Critique he clash between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker was not about their actual involvement in society and politics as such, but about bad scholarship, wrong decisions, dangerous policy and scholarly ethics.

For Becker, and for many of his German colleagues, as for their French and British counterparts, patriotism was a supreme value, especially in times of war. Snouck Hurgronje strongly condemned this choice. For him the international dimension of orientalism, expressed in the international congresses of orientalists in their publication projects such as the Encyclopaedia of Islam, and in their networks of correspondence and friendships, came irst.

He combined his cosmopolitan vision with an endorsement of the colonial project aimed at civilizing Muslims and thereby bringing them from the Middle Ages to modernity. Education of an elite and the separation of religion and politics, implying religious freedom for Muslims to practise their rituals, were important tools for creating this modernity. Understood in this manner Orientalism also ofered a tool for criticism of Western culture. Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly contrasted the Islamic condemnation of war against co-religionists and of strife in general as impious with the war craze that dominated his times.

His article was not only a defence of Dutch colonial interests, but much more an expression of utter concern about the destruction of civilization and a moral indignation about the barbarism of war, by a man who had seen suicient action himself. A more radical epistemological critique would emerge only in the s, through the work of scholars such as Foucault, Rodinson and Said.

Since then the polemic between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker has served as a case for numerous analyses in the wake of the Orientalism debate. Perhaps the Master from Leiden could teach us a grain of caution in our commitments and opinions. I thank Christiaan Engberts for allowing me to read a irst drat of a yet unpublished paper that he presented in my seminar on the history of orientalism in spring I would also like to acknowledge the hospitality enjoyed at the Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin at the invitation of its director Ulrike Freitag, and the fruitful exchanges on the involvement of Muslim soldiers in World War i with Heike Liebau and Larissa Schmid.

Snouck Hurgronje to h. Brill; ; second enlarged edition; orig. Goldziher, C. Snouck Hurgronje, C. Becker, D. MacDonald, L. Kriegsgefangene im 1. Snouck Hurgronje versus C. Geschichte 18 no. I owe this reference and a meeting with the author to Larissa Schmid, with whom I had fruitful discussions during my stay at zmo in Berlin.

Or did the proclamation originate with the Ottomans themselves and, perhaps more speciically, with the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, the men who ruled the empire during World War i? In truth, the proclamation had both German and Ottoman origins. In this chapter, I focus on the latter, to examine Ottoman uses of Jihad both before and ater November Snouck Hurgronje, in several publications denounced his German colleagues for inducing the Ottoman government to issue a world-wide call for holy war.

In particular, Snouck chastised his fellow scholars Martin Hartmann and Carl Heinrich Becker for allowing political expediency to prevail over academic integrity. By employing Jihad the state was mobilizing the support of its Muslim subjects in a time of war. While Jihad had the potential to unify Muslims against intruders, it could also, in their diplomatic relations, estrange the Ottomans from the European powers and, at home, speed up the disintegration of the multi-confessional empire by sparking hostilities between its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects.

Whether she intended to take up arms or perhaps was expressing her willingness to serve as a ield nurse remains unknown. She may also have simply expected the state to reward her patriotism monetarily and to send her home, which is how the episode ended. Such a broad understanding explains why the new coins minted in the crisis years under Sultan Mahmud ii r.

What was new was not the convergence itself but the extent to which it was employed by the state in a new era of mass society and universal conscription armies. In other words, a century so oten described as a century of secularization was, in fact, in the Ottoman case just as in societies all across Europe, one in which religion became ever more prominently a part of international conlict. In the Ottoman lands, religiously far more heterogeneous, national cleavages were reinforced rather than undercut by religious identities. In moments of violence against Christians the state rushed to punish the alleged transgressors, oten summarily without adequate investigation, in the efort to calm European diplomats and, gradually, European public opinion.

Similar calculations anticipating international support from the great powers meant that the Ottomans not only did not declare Jihad during the Crimean war or the Russian war of —, as we have seen, but also not, as we shall see, during the Italian war of — and the Balkan wars of and In this way they spread their beliefs among the local population. Perhaps policies aimed at winning converts in foreign lands. But the massacres of Armenians in the mids, during which entire villages of terriied Christians sought safety in mass conversion to Islam, suggests that one way the Muslim population could be increased was by decreasing the Christian one.

Typically such stories were built around the ideal of Jihad in terms that conlated religious and secular goals. Joe — presents himself to the recruitment oicer. Halil, with much gusto, objects to his rejection and explains that it had been his mother herself who had sent him. We, on the other hand, have studied your customs and your history. We know that you keep your word, and that the Turks oppress you by taxation and conscription.


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We respect your noble religion because we recognize its merits, and we respect also your women. Woe unto him who will venture to touch them! It is true that we belong to another faith, but we also are People with a Book Ahl el Kitab , and we practice justice and give alms to the poor. In fact, not a few European observers sympathized with the Ottomans and saw international law on their side. But his dissent also demonstrates the extent to which these policies had already begun to be implemented among non-Turkish Muslims before the November declaration.

He ofered instead to have the sultan-caliph call on all Muslims under British, French and Russian rule to rise up in rebellion.

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Certainly not. As we have seen, the Ottoman leadership, and Enver himself, promoted the idea of Jihad to mobilize both soldiers and civilians alike. It was not a weapon that could be activated upon the signal of the Ottoman sultan-caliph, the nominal head of all Muslims but in reality a ceremonial head of state in As for the Ottomans, they had scored a major diplomatic victory by signing an alliance with Germany, the great power of their choice, on 2 August. Once they had signed the alliance, however, they strove to stay out of the war while salvaging the alliance with Germany into the post- war period, during which they hoped to reform the empire under the relative international security that would be provided by the alliance with Berlin.

During the summer of and throughout the war, moreover, the Ottomans were able to draw on enormous German military aid. Contact … [the local Arab leaders]. To answer this call and rush immediately to the recruiting station is for us religion and honor. If they are needed [for the defence] of the state during wartime those over the age of forty-ive will also be called [to service]. All able-bodied Muslims are obligated by their religion to participate in jihad. On the battleield we must remember how the Prophet and his comrades fought wars for their faith and honor.

Together with us they, too, are obligated to ight against the enemy for the defense of our homeland, that is to say, for their mother, and to spill their blood and to kill and be killed on this journey. And so just as Muslims, Christians, and Jews harvest the ields together and make a living, in wartime they must ire cannons and riles, throw bombs, and wield swords together.

From Indonesia to India and to Iran, all around the Ottomans religiously-driven revitalization and resistance movements had been mobilizing for decades. When they did embrace Jihad, however, they did so primarily for domestic reasons, to mobilize the loyalty of a majority-Muslim society behind an Islamic empire. And yet, a steady stream of publications appeared unabated down to Whatever your nationality, whatever your language, the Lord has declared all of us brothers and sisters. It could be a key component in forging an alliance with a non-Muslim European power such as Germany and be employed against other non-Muslim European powers at the same time.

It could be an ideology hostile to non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire and, at other times, explicitly include non-Muslims in the Ottoman fold. Jihad could be evoked against Muslims as well as Christians. Gottheil, translated by Joseph E. Afyon: Medrese Kitabevi, For photographs of the ceremonies of 11 and 14 November in Istanbul and a photograph of the public declaration in Medina see Stanford J. Shaw, Triumph and Tragedy: November —July , vol. Toynbee, Survey of International Afairs: , vol. Beck, , p. Beck, , pp. Tauris, , pp. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed.

Klaus J. Bade et al. Archival evidence strongly suggests the latter, particularly where German policies in the Near and Middle East are concerned. Events in and around World War i are frequently quoted to support this view: the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded between unequal partners; clearly the weaker party was the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, these German policies were, in turn, presumably the blueprints for all kinds of inhuman, brutal, anti-western and anti-semitic sentiments and the behaviour of Muslims up to the present.

Like every myth it contains several grains of truth. Ater Germany did indeed wish to create an empire of its own; and ater the Germans did consider the Middle East as a promising region in which to set up an informal empire in alliance with the supposedly moribund Ottoman Empire. German imperial possessions did not seem to amount to much but in strictly territorial terms were by no means unimpressive , yet German military and political decision-makers realized quite clearly that territory or population was not the backbone of empire: it was infrastructure.

Germany possessed no such thing.

By , it was tacitly acknowledged that the Germans had lost the naval arms race, and no degree of technological superiority could obscure the fact that any German battle-cruiser far from home would eventually have to surrender for lack of fuel. Even for the most patriotic German an uncomfortable realization had dawned by Germany was weak, not strong, and surrounded by potentially hostile powers a hostility German policies before had done nothing to ward of. The German-Ottoman Alliance When representatives of the Ottoman and German Empires put their signatures to the treaty of alliance on 2 August , two very strange partners were united.

Germany was a heavily industrialized European Great Power. First, an increasing number of non-Muslims in the Empire tried to break away from imperial control and desired to set up their own national states. By , several such groups had already succeeded in doing so.

A Greek national state became independent in , a Serbian and Romanian state in Yet one should not be too hasty in judging the internal political climate within the empire, as more recent research has revealed. While there were doubtless separatists in every group, and even in the Muslim community there were some who were opposed to the ongoing preservation of a multi-ethnic and multi- religious mode of life, the majority of Muslims and non-Muslims seem to have preserved good mutual relations.

Internal disintegration thus seems to have been less of a problem. Germany might have been a strong industrial and military power, but it was located in the centre of Europe. Its choice of allies in the decades before the war had been as deicient as its general foreign policy: where Bismarck let a Germany with secure ties to all powers except France thus practically guaranteeing an equilibrium and peace in Europe in , by Germany was allied with Austria, sufering from a weak industry and internal strife between its many nationalities, and Italy, the weakest of all the European industrial powers and politically highly unreliable due to its manifold political clashes with Austria.

In Germany faced a two-front war with weak allies. For years ater the conquest of Egypt — , little political use had been made of this title. Put to a reality check, however, such notions very quickly proved erroneous. Was it a universal religion? Was it a set of social and political values? Was it a militant ideology? It seems impossible to do these crucial questions justice in a short chapter; what one may do, however, is to analyse briely how Europeans saw Islam by the outbreak of World War i. Some of them, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt in Britain, became lifelong advocates of the rights of the colonized populations, and thorns in the lesh of colonial and colonizing politicians; some developed ingenuous, not altogether well-founded theories of how the colonized Muslims might be used for the interests of one European Great Power against its rivals.

One of the most noteworthy examples of the latter kind was German baron Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who may with some justiication claim to be the most inluential individual in bringing about the German pan-Islamic Propaganda during World War i. No serious Orientalist could ever be accused of having misconceived Islam as one monolithic body.

But it was especially these highly de-centralized Muslim brotherhoods who had demonstrated their militant potential at several occasions: in Algeria, in Libya, the Sudan, Somalia, etc. Although at the margins of the German political establishment, the baron managed to persuade the German government to set up an elaborate apparatus for conducting pan-Islamic propaganda from to With the beneit of hindsight it can be argued that this propaganda campaign failed: yet what were the reasons for this failure?

Was the central mistake that the pan-Islam the Germans had been appealing to did not exist? Muslim Nationalism: Reality or Chimera? Muslims did ight when their independence was threatened: this had been amply proved in the cases of Algeria, the Sudan, the Caucasus, Libya, to name but a few. Yet even so a sober analysis of these localized conlicts pitching Muslims against Western colonizers could give the Western powers reason to be cautiously optimistic. Muslims had oten held of colonial conquest for years, if not decades, yet they had ultimately been defeated.

On the other hand the Western powers were aware that Muslims could not accept such defeats as permanent. Consequently, Muslim colonial populations were regarded with a great deal of apprehension. Even if they seemed to acquiesce in colonial control, there might be smouldering resentment, which the right call to Jihad at the right time under the right conditions could blow up into an open conlagration. Localized revolts or resistance movements might be overcome; a global Muslim Jihad against the colonial powers might not. As has already been pointed out, regardless of the rather disdainful views of Western Orientalists about the very existence of pan-Islam, politicians feared it greatly — that is to say, politicians of those powers which had colonial possessions to lose.

Pan-Islam, in principle, is a tautological expression. One of the very foundations of Islam is the idea of the umma, the world-wide community of all Muslims, which is supposed to have a deeper meaning than any particular ethnic, cultural or political identities. Pan-Islam, however, is a useful term to describe the political consequences of this feeling of solidarity and belonging together of Muslims.

Pan-Islam centred, of course, on the igure of the caliph, and it is partly this orientation which must be seen as one of the central weaknesses of pan-Islam as a movement. It might be argued that, amongst all Islamic institutions and legal terms, the caliphate is one of the worst-deined. Its very origins were an act of improvization. Ater the death of the prophet two systems of succession were pitched against each other: that of election of the most digniied member of the community against that of family relationship with the prophet. Caliphs also could be powerless igureheads, their spiritual inluence notwithstanding.

It might be argued that the Mongols abolished the caliphate for the irst time, killing the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad in thus in efect abolishing it years before the Turkish Grand National Assembly. According to oicial Ottoman legend, in Ottoman sultan Selim i was proclaimed caliph by the last member of the Abbasid dynasty in Cairo. Becoming caliph meant a great increase of prestige for the Ottoman sultans. It is generally acknowledged that the Ottoman sultan was accorded a particularly exalted position, as far as Muslim rulers were concerned, from the sixteenth century onwards.

Not only was he able to instil in Indian Muslims loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate — amongst other things evidenced by hutba being read in his name in Indian mosques — but he was even able to demonstrate his pan-Islamic powers to colonial powers: the sultan could, if he saw it, exert his inluence on behalf of the colonial powers, and make sure that their Muslim subjects were quiet and obedient.

It was therefore in their interest not to treat the Ottoman Empire aggressively. And, of course, see Germany proit handsomely from these develop- ments. It was too good to be true. Muslims did indeed feel solidarity with the Ottoman Empire during World War i; but Muslim nationalists very soon made it overly clear that their main interest was the independence of their home countries from all outside powers — including the Ottomans.

Yet the deep rits between diferent interpretations of Islam had never been overcome. During the First World War many, if not most, Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and outside it realized that this was not their war; they feared the deprivations and ravages of war, saw it as entirely unnecessary and did their best to preserve their neutrality.

Yet how had the German — and not only German, but Western — misreading of the possible behaviour of Muslims come about? Second, the Committee of Union and Progress had by already squandered a good deal of its Muslim credentials, the gravest of which was to reduce the sultan-caliph to little more than a igurehead. Political Errors: The Young Turks and the Sultan-Caliph Although Kansu has argued to the contrary, the revolution of was not particularly revolutionary. Matters came to a head less than a year later, when the attempted counter-revolution of 31 March failed.

Yet, on the other hand, it gradually dawned on the Young Turks that in doing so they had committed a grave political error: in the revolution of they had converted an autocratic into a constitutional monarchy. However, as the monarch in question also happened to claim the caliphate with some reason, the Young Turks had created the legal novelty of a constitutional caliph, which most Muslims regarded as impossible. Finally, in , they had deposed the caliph, although, in terms of Islamic law, no charge could be brought against him. Reshat was under the irm control of the Ottoman government if not directly the Young Turks , and that both the sultanate and the caliphate had been seriously reduced in power.

For the leading political force of what claimed to be a Muslim empire, the Young Turks indeed had behaved strangely, if not to a certain extent suicidally. The Reformation of Islam Today some Muslim scholars, as well as many Western observers of Islam critical of its supposed incompatibility with modernity, West- ern values, democracy and the rule of secular law, point to the need for a reformation of Islam.

Two dimensions of this reformation have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the issue of religious reform. Luther initially had no intention to ofer a fundamentally diferent interpretation of Catholic Christianity and even less so did Henry viii of England. Muslim nationalists in the making realized that Islam was not opposed to nationalism, but on the contrary could serve as a vital social glue to form national communities. It was to serve the state and to be under state supervision; and the formation of national states of Muslims was not in contradiction to the concept of the umma: Muslims simply would have to develop a dual personality.

On the one hand, as Muslims, they could continue to be part of the umma; on the other hand, as nationals, their loyalty was due to their nation and national state. It was not until the end of October that the Ottoman leet — greatly reinforced by two German cruisers having sought sanctuary in the Golden Horn and later been acquired by the Ottoman navy — was ordered to attack Russian harbours and shipping in the Black Sea. Eyewitnesses reported an enthusiastic reaction by the local Muslim populace. However, soon aterwards reports by German diplomats from the Ottoman provinces painted a less rosy picture: most Ottoman Muslims reacted with indiference to the proclamation.

Clearly the proclamation and the lustre of the caliphate had been insuicient to produce the German- desired results. Max von Oppenheim was undeterred: if an Ottoman proclamation failed to produce a Jihad, a protracted German propaganda campaign would in due course lead to success.

At irst it did not even get proper accommodation. Lack of oice space necessitated its move from the Foreign Oice building in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, to the Reichskolonialamt Imperial Colonial Oice , and eventually to a spacious lat in the Tauentzienstrasse. Yet the diferences in German and Ottoman interests in the Middle East, which were soon to emerge, made a central organization of German and Ottoman propaganda impossible and strongly contributed to its ultimate failure.

In spite of oicial scepticism and their own doubts about the existence or appeal of pan-Islam before the war, a considerable number of German Orientalists served in the IOfE. Ruth Buka — Dr. Walter Lehmann — Dr. Helmut von Glasenapp — Ernst Neuenhofer businessman — Mr. If Oppenheim had designed it that way in the expectation that the expertise of diferent backgrounds and careers could be put to best use, the result was quite the opposite.

Schabinger was arguably better suited to provide such leadership than Oppenheim; he was used to the hierarchical system of the diplomatic service and an authoritarian and energetic personality. Ahmad Vali and Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat, likewise might largely be ascribed to diferences originating in cultural attitudes rather than to personal malice on either of the two sides. Max Adler, who from September onwards was in charge of the pow newspaper Al-Jihad and of despatching periodical war reports. Adler fully concurred. He proposed the transfer of responsibility for the war reports to local consulates in the Middle East, which were better suited to producing up-to-date material than the IOfE.

Instead of Al-Jihad, he argued, Turkish newspapers should be used and read out by literate prisoners. Under such circumstances Dr. Adler declared himself unable to continue his work for the institution and he let on 1 June Jacoby seems to have been a charming and eicient character, and his work with the Egyptians in general yielded good results. None of them wanted a German Egypt or India, and the majority of Egyptians, although desirous of getting rid of the British, opposed a reincorporation of their country into the Ottoman Empire as an ordinary province.

In their attempts to support all factions and Ottoman aspirations at the same time the Germans merely wasted their energy. Once told that the Ottoman army would conquer the country for Turkey and not for Abbas Hilmi the Khe- dive switly lost interest and even tried his hand at counter-propaganda in Egypt.

Frightened by an attempt on his life, which he blamed on the cup, he went irst to Vienna and later to Switzerland. While most of the Egyptian nationalists were of a fairly conservative upper class background the Indian Independence Committee consisted of avowedly radical revolutionaries. Under these circumstances success for Ottoman propaganda in India was most unlikely. In fact the only success scored by the iic as alleged by Schabinger, and not corroborated by other sources was the acquisition of information which played a role in the torpedoing and sinking by a German submarine of the armoured cruiser hms Hampshire, on which Lord Kitchener travelled to Russia in Caution was in some cases justiied, in regard to both individuals and proposed operations, and as to what the IOfE could hope to achieve generally.

Schabinger reported to the Foreign Oice on 5 February his misgivings about the plan to incite the Afghan army to march on India, then under consideration by the German military and civilian leadership. Schabinger believed that most probably the invading Afghans would be opposed both by the British and by a large part of the Indian population; worse, the Japanese might be tempted to invade India, which they had coveted for a long time.

Schabinger instead proposed to have the Afghans march on Russian Central Asia and Iran, where they could join the Turkish army. In a report of summer Schabinger listed rising anxiety of the French and the British about the loyalty of their Muslim troops and the colonies as among the most important successes. Defectors were few in number. In one case the British replaced Indian troops on the Western Front with British troops, due to the presence of Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi, who had called for Holy War from the German trenches with the aid of a megaphone.

Although he admitted that his revolutionary propaganda did not yield the expected results revolts in India , he maintained that the propaganda had occasionally been reason for great anxiety for the British and had served to keep them from sending additional troops to the Western Front. But I always said that the Indian nationalists would advance in their quest for national independence, and that truly happened.

Conclusion World War i was a crucial event in the history of the modern world, and also in the history of the modern Middle East. It saw the end of an era: ater an existence of more than years the longest-lived Muslim empire ever the Ottoman period in the Middle East ended in the atermath of Ottoman defeat.